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 The Special Nature of International 
Insurance and Reinsurance 
Arbitration: 
A Response to Professor Jerry 
S.I. Strong* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As Professor Jerry has so eloquently demonstrated, dispute resolution plays a 
significant role in the insurance industry, even though very few academics have 
written about the special nature of this area of law, largely because of a lack of 
communication between specialists in insurance law and specialists in dispute 
resolution.1  Though understandable from a historical perspective, this sort of 
separation of substantive and procedural expertise can create numerous individual 
and systemic problems.2  Not only are parties left without a full appreciation of 
the scope and nature of the dispute resolution options that are available to them, 
but courts and legislatures are forced to make critical determinations about the 
content and shape of the law without a proper understanding of how various 
mechanisms operate in a particular context.3 
One unfortunate side effect of the current situation has been the unspoken as-
sumption that dispute resolution of insurance matters can or should be considered 
analogous to procedures used in other areas of law.4  While some similarities of 
course exist, insurance disputes involve a number of unique attributes that require 
specialized analysis.5  As a result, Professor Jerry is completely correct in calling 
for more intensive consideration of how dispute resolution processes operate in 
                                                          
    * Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge; D.Phil., University of Oxford; J.D., Duke University; 
M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The author, who is 
admitted to practice as an attorney in New York, Illinois and Missouri and as a solicitor in England and 
Wales, is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Senior Fellow at 
the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution. The author would like to thank Bob Jerry for com-
ments on earlier drafts of this Response and Paul Stephan for comments relating to the self-execution 
analysis. Thanks are also due to former colleagues in the Chicago and London offices of Baker & 
McKenzie LLP who introduced the author to the world of international insurance and reinsurance law. 
All errors of course remain the author’s own. 
 1. See Robert H. Jerry, II, Dispute Resolution, Insurance, and Points of Convergence, 2015 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 255 (2015).   
 2. Experience in other fields has shown the type of issues that can arise in cases where substantive 
experts do not communicate with procedural experts. See S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: 
Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1157, 1165 (2012) (discussing the lack of 
communication between arbitration specialists and trust law specialists in cases involving arbitration of 
internal trust disputes). 
 3. See id. at 1165-66, 1193-95 (discussing problems in the context of trust arbitration). 
 4. See infra notes 27-28, 35-40 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 256. 
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the insurance industry so as to ensure the development and use of fair and efficient 
procedures.6 
Professor Jerry has provided an excellent overview of the field and has 
demonstrated the need for further work in a variety of areas of insurance law.  
This Response seeks to further illustrate a number of Professor Jerry’s points by 
going into depth in one specific area of insurance law, namely international insur-
ance and reinsurance arbitration.7  In so doing, this Response hopes to provide 
experts in both insurance law and dispute resolution with new insights about this 
particular procedure while also inspiring further work in this area.  Although the 
current analysis is intended to be introductory rather than comprehensive, the 
discussion nevertheless seeks to demonstrate the diversity and depth of legal and 
policy issues associated with international insurance and reinsurance arbitration. 
Perhaps the best way of illustrating the complexity of this area of law is by 
describing some of the legal tensions that are characteristic of international insur-
ance arbitration.  Three key conflicts exist.  The first, which is discussed in Sec-
tion III, involves the interaction between international law and U.S. constitutional 
law.  This issue, which is becoming particularly acute, arises as a result of the 
debate about the extent to which the McCarran-Ferguson Act reverse preempts 
certain legal principles in international disputes.8 
The second type of conflict involves the tension between U.S. and foreign 
law.  This discussion, which appears in Section IV, is placed in the context of 
Bermuda Form arbitration, although the points are equally applicable to other 
types of international insurance arbitration. 
The third and final type of conflict arises at the policy level.  This analysis, 
which is found in Section V, focuses on the tension between the pro-arbitration 
policy exhibited by the United States and other countries in matters involving 
international commercial disputes and the principle of state regulation to promote 
the public interest in insurance law.  Inherent in this discussion is the question of 
whether private parties should be able to exercise their personal autonomy to cre-
ate dispute resolution mechanisms that may subvert or conflict with certain public 
values.9 
Although the various analyses are meant to be introductory rather than com-
prehensive, they nevertheless require a relatively sophisticated understanding of 
the relevant legal principles.  Since most readers do not have expertise in all three 
areas of practice (insurance law, arbitration law and international law), it may be 
helpful to provide a small amount of background information about both insur-
                                                          
 6. See id. at 256. 
 7. Although Professor Jerry is correct that all forms of insurance dispute resolution deserve more 
attention, the literature on international insurance arbitration is particularly sparse.  For example, a 
Westlaw search of all journals and law reviews looking for materials with the words “insur! and arbi-
tration or ‘dispute resolution’” in the title yielded only 56 hits.  However, when the word “internation-
al” was added to the search parameters, Westlaw identified only 6 items.  While there are doubtless a 
number of relevant articles that do not feature those particular words in the title, a search for articles 
with the word “insur!” in the title yielded 7,592 items while a similar search for articles with the word 
“arbitration” yielded 5,814 items.  The combination of “international” and “arbitration” resulted in 
1,043 items.  This phenomenon confirms Professor Jerry’s hypothesis that insurance law and arbitra-
tion law are largely distinct fields while also showing how limited the scholarship on international 
insurance arbitration is. See id. at 256. 
 8. See 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012). 
 9. See Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse Preemption of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 262-63 (2004-2005). 
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ance law and international arbitration to facilitate conversations across discipli-
nary lines.  This material is found in Section II below. 
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE AND 
ARBITRATION LAW 
The specialized nature of most areas of law can make interdisciplinary work 
extremely challenging.  Errors may be particularly likely to arise in situations 
where three different disciplines intersect, as is the case with international insur-
ance arbitration, where each of the individual fields of inquiry (international law, 
insurance law and arbitration law) are extremely complicated.  Although it is it 
impossible to provide a comprehensive analysis of each practice area in this Re-
sponse,10 it is nevertheless helpful to mention a few basic background points to 
put the substantive discussion into context. 
A. Basic Principles of International Insurance and Reinsurance Law 
Although most lawyers believe themselves familiar with insurance law as a 
result of their first-year tort class and their routine daily experiences,11 interna-
tional insurance and reinsurance differ from domestic insurance in a number of 
ways.  The key difference, of course, is geographic, since international insurance 
involves “insurance underwritten in one country covering risks in another” as well 
as “insurance that covers an insured for risks beyond the borders of the insured’s 
home country.”12  However, the term “international insurance” can also be used to 
refer to various types of reinsurance, which is an insurance mechanism that is 
outside the scope of most lawyers’ expertise.  Rather than providing direct, prima-
ry coverage for a particular risk, reinsurance involves the process of transferring 
or “ceding” the risk of insurance from one entity to another.13  Reinsurance often 
                                                          
 10. Further reading is of course available for those seeking more information on any particular point. 
For background on insurance law, see ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS S. RICHMOND, 
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (5th ed. 2012); STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 
(2015). For background on international commercial arbitration, see NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., 
REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (5th ed. 2009); GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2014); S.I. STRONG, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES (2012) [hereinafter STRONG, GUIDE], availa-
ble at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/strongarbit.pdf/$file/strongarbit.pdf. For background 
on international law, see JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th 
ed. 2012). The American Law Institute (ALI) is also developing a number of relevant Restatements. 
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE; RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION. 
 11. Of course, as Professor Jerry notes, insurance law is much more complicated than most people 
believe. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 257-260. 
 12. PETER A. MCLAUCHLAN, Keeping on Top of Trends in the International Insurance Marketplace, 
in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEVELOPING 
PURCHASE STRATEGIES AND OVERCOMING REGULATORY CHALLENGES (2015), available at 2015 WL 
831989, *1, *1. 
 13. See PLITT ET AL., supra note 10, § 9.2. Vocabulary in this field can be confusing. For example, 
“[t]he insurance company that is transferring or ‘ceding’ its risk is known as the reinsured, the 
‘cedent,’ the original insurer, or the direct insurer” while “[t]he insurance company to which the risk is 
being transferred is known as the reinsurer;” “the person or entity that acquires the original insurance 
contract from the original insurer . . . is . . . known as the original insured.” Id. (footnotes omitted). A 
reinsurer is itself “free to transfer the reinsured risk to another reinsurer, acquiring its own reinsur-
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occurs across national borders so as to spread the risk of loss in a more economi-
cally efficient manner.14 
Another practical difference between domestic and international insurance in-
volves the type of coverage.  Most people think of insurance in the context of 
everyday matters, with automobile insurance, health insurance and life insurance 
representing the best-known types of insurance.15  Although international insur-
ance and reinsurance can address these sorts of concerns,16 international insurance 
also provides for more specialized and often individualized types of risk17 ranging 
from maritime matters18 and excess liability19 to political risk, terrorism and kid-
napping.20  International insurance also exists for more esoteric matters such as 
“rocket launches . . . as well as global rock tours.”21 
                                                          
ance.” Id. (footnotes omitted). “Such a transaction is known as a ‘retrocessional agreement. The trans-
ferring reinsurer is known as the ‘retrocedent’ and the reinsurer assuming the risk is known as a ‘retro-
cessionaire.’” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 14. See Hubertus Labes, Selected Areas and Issues of Arbitration in Germany: Arbitration of Insur-
ance Disputes in Germany, in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 889, 890 
(Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel & Stefan Michael Kröll et al. eds., 2015); Jerry, supra note 1, at 276; see also 
Mauricio Gomm Ferreira Dos Santos, Arbitration in the Light of the Opening of the Brazilian Reinsur-
ance Market, V REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ARBITRAGEM 38, 38-43 (2008). 
 15. In fact, insurance is a much broader field, as Professor Jerry notes. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 
257-260. 
 16. For example, reinsurance cover involves virtually every type of matter contained in a domestic 
insurer’s book of business. 
 17. See Jerry, supra note 1 at 276; see also Lorelie S. Masters, International Insurance: Purchase 
and Claim Strategies, in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS 
ON DEVELOPING PURCHASE STRATEGIES AND OVERCOMING REGULATORY CHALLENGES (2015), 
available at 2015 WL 831988, *1, *1-2 (discussing various types of insurance needed by businesses 
operating across national borders); McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *3 (noting international insurance 
can address “property, casualty, life, and health . . . because of the commonality of risk issues through-
out the world”). 
 18. Maritime insurance was the first type of international insurance to develop. See McLauchlan, 
supra note 12, at *1. 
 19. Excess liability insurance  
track[s] the primary insurance in coverage, conditions, definitions, and exclusions. The excess 
carrier relies on the primary carrier for coverage interpretations. The excess contract will not pick 
up coverages that are left out of the primary policy. It is and should be used as a means of layer-
ing limits of liability to the level needed by the insured.  
Howard Ende et al., Liability Insurance: A Primer for College and University Counsel, 23 J.C. & U.L. 
609, 675 (1997); see also Richard C. Mason et al., Recent Developments in Excess Insurance, Surplus 
Lines Insurance, and Reinsurance Law, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 331, 367-69 (2011) (discuss-
ing international issues, among other things). 
 20. Political risk insurance is becoming increasingly important to companies operating international-
ly and includes a variety of types of coverage, including that relating to “1. political violence, 2. terror-
ism, 3. confiscation, expropriation, and nationalization, 4. contract frustration, 5. currency inconverti-
bility, 6. kidnap and ransom, and 7. selective discrimination.” Sandra Smith Thayer, Political Risk 
Insurance: Coverage for Your International Investment, in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW CLIENT 
STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEVELOPING PURCHASE STRATEGIES AND OVERCOMING 
REGULATORY CHALLENGES (Aspatore 2015), available at 2015 WL 831986, *1, *1; see also Irene S. 
Kaptzis, Note, Looking Beyond the Sunset: International Perspectives on the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act of 2002 and the Issue of Its Renewal, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 827, 828 (2004) (discussing the Ter-
rorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which has been extended to the year 2020 pursuant to the Terror-
ism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-1, 129 Stat. 3)). Many political 
risk policies include arbitration provisions. See Thayer, supra, at *5. Furthermore, a number of these 
issues would arise in claims arising under investment treaties, suggesting a potentially significant 
overlap between insurance law and international investment arbitration (also known as treaty-based 
arbitration or investor-state arbitration and sometimes involving bilateral treaty arbitration (BIT arbi-
tration) or arbitration under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
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Another difference between international and domestic insurance involves the 
role that regulation and public policy play.22  Domestic insurance is a highly regu-
lated field, although most laws exist at the state rather than federal level.23  This 
phenomenon has resulted in numerous discrepancies in insurance practices across 
the United States, including with respect to the availability of arbitration.24  Alt-
hough the situation is changing, with a number of states now allowing arbitration 
of insurance disputes,25 the availability of arbitration is still highly regulated.26 
Insurance arbitration has been challenged for many of the same reasons that 
have been raised in other types of domestic arbitration such as employment and 
consumer arbitration.27  Indeed, many types of insurance arbitration can and per-
haps should be classified as a form of consumer arbitration, although that is a 
question that would benefit from further analysis.28  However, it is unclear wheth-
er any or all of the criticisms that have been aimed at arbitration of domestic in-
surance disputes also apply to arbitration of international insurance disputes. 
                                                          
and Nationals of Other States (ICSID arbitration)). See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a 
Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: The Re-Politicization of International 
Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 211, 234 (2010); Franco Ferrari et al., Panel 3: Multi-
Party Arbitration Issues in International Project Finance Arbitration, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 759, 768-
772 (2013). While this Response does not address the overlap between insurance and investment 
arbitration, the issues are intriguing. See Mark Kantor, Comparing Political Risk Insurance and In-
vestment Treaty Arbitration, in A Revolution in the International Rule of Law: Essays in Honor of Don 
Wallace, Jr., 455, 455-56 (Borzu Sabahi et al. eds., 2014). 
 21. McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *1. 
 22. See Robert E. Keeton, Statutory Analogy, Purpose, and Policy in Legal Reasoning: Live Lob-
sters and a Tiger Cub in the Park, 52 MD. L. REV. 1192, 1198 (1993) (“Insurance law reflects two 
compelling themes – contract and public policy.”); Leo P. Martinez, A Unified Theory of Insurance 
Risk, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 713, 740-41 (2013). 
 23. See Martinez, supra note 22, at 740-41; Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note 
12, at *2. 
 24. See Mariana Isabel Hernández-Gutiérrez, The Remaining Hostility Towards Arbitration Shielded 
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act: How Far Should the Protection to Policyholders Go? 1 U. PUERTO 
RICO BUS. L.J. 35, 35-36 (2010); Jerry, supra note 1, at 274. 
 25. As Professor Jerry notes, arbitration is standard in many disputes involving the ISO Commercial 
General Liability policy as well as in matters involving automobile insurance, crop insurance and 
various types of commercial insurance, including those relating to directors and officers (D&O), em-
ployment liability, cyber liability, and errors and omissions (E&O). See Jerry, supra note 1, at 274-
275. Arbitration is also common in other types of insurance, including healthcare insurance. See Jean 
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just? 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632 (2005). How-
ever, many states have prohibited arbitration of insurance disputes pursuant to the doctrine of reverse 
preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  See 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012); see also infra notes 
68-72. 
 26. See Hernández-Gutiérrez, supra note 24, at 35-36. 
 27. See Randall, supra note 9, at 262-63 (noting various issues ranging from concerns about due 
process and matters involving individual costs to worries about the resolution of socially important 
disputes outside the public eye). 
 28. Some commentators already appear to consider insurance arbitration to fall within the realm of 
consumer arbitration involving financial services. See Sternlight, supra note 25, at 1632. However, 
other authorities, including various legislatures, specifically exclude insurance arbitration from the 
definition of consumer arbitration. See Laura Magnotta, I Agreed to What? Protecting Consumers 
From Unfair Practices in Binding Consumer Arbitration, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MED. 190, 191 (2012) 
(discussing a consumer protection provision enacted by Maryland that explicitly excluded matters 
involving property insurance, casualty insurance and surety insurance).  This particular issue may be 
addressed in the forthcoming Restatement on liability insurance, which distinguishes between sophisti-
cated and unsophisticated policyholders.  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE §1 
and cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1 dated April 9, 2013). 
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Closer examination of the insurance industry demonstrates a number of key 
differences between international and domestic insurance that could and perhaps 
should affect analyses about the propriety of arbitration in each of those fields.  
For example, most international insurance policies are typically negotiated at 
arm’s length by two equally sophisticated commercial actors rather than imposed 
by a stronger party on a vulnerable individual.29  These types of issues have been 
considered significant when distinguishing between different types of arbitration 
outside the insurance context.30 
International insurance also differs from domestic insurance in terms of the 
amount and type of regulation that exists.31  For example, rather than being subject 
to detailed regulatory requirements, most forms of international insurance are only 
“regulated by states from a security/solvency standpoint.”32  While this phenome-
non can be traced to certain practical difficulties associated with controlling trans-
national activities in the absence of a single political actor with global regulatory 
authority,33 the lack of international regulation can also be attributed to the fact 
that international insurance involves highly individualized (as opposed to stand-
ardized) types of risks that are quite simply not amenable to blanket regulation.34 
B. Basic Principles of International Arbitration Law 
Many commentators, including those in the insurance realm, criticize arbitra-
tion as providing “second class” or “rough justice,” based on the belief that all 
insurance disputes are subject to highly routinized procedures that cannot provide 
parties with the proper procedural safeguards to ensure a fair result.35  Although 
the veracity of these sorts of claims can and has been disputed (indeed, empirical 
studies suggest that many of these types of criticisms are largely incorrect in the 
context of both consumer and employment arbitration),36 there is nothing about 
international arbitration that can be framed as constituting “rough justice.”37  To 
the contrary, international arbitration has been referred to as “‘Rolls Royce’ jus-
tice” as a result of the extremely sophisticated procedures that are used to resolve 
complex, high-value and highly individualized disputes.38  Unlike consumer and 
                                                          
 29. See Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2. 
 30. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 3-5. 
 31. See Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2. 
 32. McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2; see also Masters, supra note 17, at *3 (discussing regulatory 
regime). Some types of voluntary self-regulation also exist in the international realm. See McLauchlan, 
supra note 12, at *3 (discussing the rise of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS) over the last decade). 
 33. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American 
Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009); S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European 
Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a New Analogue? 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899, 913 (2012) 
[hereinafter Strong, Regulatory Litigation]. 
 34. See Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2. 
 35. See generally Randall, supra note 9, at 257-63 (identifying numerous individual and collective 
criticisms of insurance arbitration). 
 36. See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement is Reshaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 179, 187 (2003). 
 37. See Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration Is Not Arbitration, 2008 STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. 
REV. 1, 1-2; see also STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 4-5. 
 38. Mitchell F. Dolin & Ethan M. Posner, Understanding the Bermuda Excess Liability Form, 1 J. 
INS. COVERAGE 68, 79 (1998) (quoting RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND 
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employment arbitration, which involve standardized arbitration provisions that are 
imposed by businesses on vulnerable individuals, international arbitration tradi-
tionally involves two corporate entities that have negotiated their transaction, 
including their dispute resolution clause, at arm’s length.39  As a result, one of the 
leading commentators in the field has claimed that “the essential difference” be-
tween international and other types of arbitration “is so great that their similarities 
are largely illusory.”40 
In most cases, the key rationale supporting international commercial arbitra-
tion is not the savings of time and money, although parties of course hope for such 
a result.41  Instead, parties choose international arbitration to avoid lengthy and 
expensive disputes about jurisdiction, to ensure a politically neutral decision-
maker with particular expertise in the substance of the dispute, and, perhaps most 
importantly, to reap the advantages of various international treaties providing for 
the speedy and efficient enforcement of arbitral awards across international bor-
ders.42  All of these rationales are as relevant to disputes involving international 
insurance and reinsurance claims as they are to other sorts of international com-
mercial matters. 
The two most important treaties in this field, at least for U.S. parties, are the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards (commonly known as the New York Convention)43 and the Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (commonly 
known as the Panama Convention).44  With 156 states parties, the New York Con-
vention is more widely adhered-to than the Panama Convention, which is only 
regional in scope.45  However, the Panama Convention takes precedence over the 
New York Convention in cases where both instruments apply.46  Because the two 
conventions are very similar in their operative terms and are intended to be inter-
preted in a consistent manner, most commentators simply discuss the New York 
Convention, as will be the case here.47 
Although the New York Convention is central to the international arbitral re-
gime, the convention actually serves a very limited purpose, namely the identifica-
tion of the circumstances in which an arbitration agreement or arbitral award will 
be enforced internationally.48  As a result, parties seeking to resolve a dispute 
                                                          
ARBITRATION 455 (1994)); see also STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 4-5 (discussing nature of inter-
national arbitration). 
 39. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 4-5. 
 40. Paulsson, supra note 37, at 1. 
 41. See BORN, supra note 10, at 73-93.   
 42. See id. 
 43. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]; 9 U.S.C. §201 (2012). 
 44. See Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; 9 U.S.C. §301 (2012). 
 45. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Status: 1958 Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http:// 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_ status.html (last visited Aug. 5, 
2015) [hereinafter New York Convention Status]; see also Panama Convention, supra note 44, pmbl. 
 46. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Panama Convention, supra note 44; STRONG, GUIDE, 
supra note 10, at 6-7. 
 47. See New York Convention, supra note 43; John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and Its 
Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 19-23 (2000). 
 48. See New York Convention, supra note 43, arts. II-III, V. 
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relating to international arbitration must have recourse to a variety of other author-
ities.49  The type of authority used will depend on the type of dispute at issue.50 
One of the more important types of legal authorities in international arbitra-
tion involves national laws on arbitration.51  Although national laws on arbitration 
address a broader range of subjects than international treaties do, most arbitration 
laws are also somewhat limited in scope and primarily address the role that courts 
may play in international arbitration.52 
The two most important enactments for parties seeking judicial assistance in 
the United States are Chapters 2 and 3 (the “international chapters”) of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).53  Notably, Chapter 1 of the FAA (the “domestic chapter”) 
only applies to international arbitration to the extent that chapter is not superseded 
by or inconsistent with Chapters 2 and 3.54  Although some U.S. states have enact-
ed their own laws on international arbitration, it is unclear whether and to what 
extent these laws are preempted by the FAA.55  Thus, at this point, most of the 
U.S. law of international arbitration exists at the federal level.56 
International arbitration is also subject to numerous other sources of law.57  
Some of these authorities (such as procedural rules promulgated by various arbi-
tral institutions) are chosen by the parties rather than imposed by the state.58  Oth-
er materials (such as scholarly commentary and arbitral awards rendered in other 
disputes) are considered persuasive rather than mandatory.59  However, most in-
ternational arbitrators give great weight to these sorts of authorities, since reliance 
on such materials allows the development of a consistent and predictable approach 
to the resolution of international disputes and provides for a procedural mecha-
nism.60 
As this discussion shows, the depth and diversity of persuasive authorities in 
international arbitration is much more extensive than non-specialists realize.61  
Not only do parties and practitioners have access to a significant and ever-
increasing number of published arbitral awards (something that does not exist in 
                                                          
 49. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 12-24. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 14-15 (discussing the role of national law in international arbitration). 
 52. See id. at 14 (noting that most arbitration statutes do not discuss the procedures to be used during 
the arbitration itself). 
 53. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-307 (2012); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 24-27. Chapter 2 relates to 
the New York Convention while Chapter 3 relates to the Panama Convention. See id.; see also New 
York Convention, supra note 43; Panama Convention, supra note 44; 9 U.S.C. §§201, 301 (2012).  
 54. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 25-27; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307.  
 55. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (1985) with amendments as adopted in 2006, Status, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (not-
ing that the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law has been adopted by California, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon and Texas); Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act 
Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 395 (2004). 
 56. See BORN, supra note 10, at 157; S.I. Strong, Border Skirmishes: The Intersection Between 
Litigation and International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 nn. 9-10. 
 57. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 12-24. 
 58. See S.I. STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 12-14 (2009) [hereinafter STRONG, RESEARCH] (distinguishing between 
public and private forms of authority); see also STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 19 (listing well-
known arbitral institutions in international matters).  
 59. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 21-23. 
 60. See id. at 23. 
 61. See generally STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 58, at 83-85, 88-137. 
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many types of domestic arbitration, including consumer arbitration),62 they also 
have access to a vast body of commentary concerning international arbitration.63  
Together, these materials create a system that is much more transparent and pre-
dictable than non-specialists appreciate.64 
Although some differences may arise between international insurance and re-
insurance arbitration and other sorts of international arbitration, insurance disputes 
nevertheless fall within the general umbrella of international arbitration.65  As a 
result, the entire body of national, international and persuasive law concerning 
international commercial arbitration can and should be considered applicable to 
matters involving international insurance and reinsurance. 
III. INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE ARBITRATION – 
TENSIONS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The highly regulated nature of the U.S. insurance industry can sometimes 
suggest that all matters involving insurance can and should be determined exclu-
sively by reference to the law of individual U.S. states.66  However, international 
insurance disputes can require recourse to other types of law, most notably inter-
national and constitutional law.67  In some cases, a potential conflict arises be-
tween the various types of law, as illustrated by the recent debate about reverse 
preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.68 
The concept of “reverse preemption” is well-known in insurance circles and 
involves situations in which Congress defers to state authority, thereby allowing 
                                                          
 62. See id. at 83-85. Various types of arbitral awards are published in summary or redacted form. 
See New York City Bar, Committee on International Commercial Disputes, Publication of Interna-
tional Arbitral Awards and Decisions 8, 10 (Feb. 2014),  
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072645-
PublicationofInternationalArbitrationAwardsandDecisions.pdf (noting, for example, that the Society of 
Maritime Arbitrators usually publishes all awards in their entirety). 
 63. See generally STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 58, at 88-137. 
 64. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 21-24. 
 65. For example, insurance matters can be considered “commercial” in nature and therefore falls 
within the scope of the New York Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. I(3); 
BORN, supra note 10, at 307 (noting most countries, including the United States, have adopted a rela-
tively broad definition of “commercial” in the context of international commercial arbitration); S.I. 
Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty and Statutory Inter-
pretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 536 (2013) [hereinafter 
Strong, Treaty] (noting “the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution . . . is broadly construed as a 
matter of both constitutional and arbitral law”); see also U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 3; Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-19 (2001); infra note 134 and accompanying text.  
 66. See Martinez, supra note 22, at 740-41; Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note 
12, at *2. 
 67. See Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (considering constitutional issues in the context 
of a conflict of laws issue involving Wisconsin and Minnesota law); Ario v. The Underwriting Mem-
bers of Syndicate 53 at Lloyd’s for the 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 286 (3d Cir. 2010) (con-
sidering the interaction between the FAA and the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act in a case 
involving the New York Convention); Thomas O. Main, On Teaching Conflicts and Why I Dislike 
Allstate Insurance v. Hague, 12 NEV. L.J. 600, 600 (2012) (noting that Allstate Ins. v. Hague required 
the U.S. Supreme Court to consider “the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses”). 
 68. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). Other types of preemption questions may arise in the future as 
more states attempt to enact legislation dealing with international commercial arbitration. See Drahoz-
al, supra note 55, at 395; see also Ario, 618 F.3d at 286 (discussing preemption in context of FAA and 
Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act). 
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state law to trump (i.e., reverse preempt) federal law.69  According to the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act, “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, 
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the busi-
ness of insurance, . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insur-
ance.”70  Thus, “McCarran-Ferguson authorizes ‘reverse preemption’ of generally 
applicable federal statutes by state laws enacted for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance.”71 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act has been held to authorize reverse preemption 
of the FAA in cases where state law bars arbitration of domestic insurance dis-
putes falling entirely under Chapter 1 of the FAA.72  While this conclusion is in-
controvertible in the domestic realm, problems arise in international disputes due 
to questions involving the nature of the New York Convention and the relation-
ship between the convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA.73 
According to the terms of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, reverse preemption 
only applies to “acts of Congress.”74  As a result, McCarran-Ferguson would not 
seem to apply to issues governed by international treaties, since a treaty is not 
technically an “Act of Congress.”75  However, certain problems arise as a result of 
the way that international treaties are given domestic effect in U.S. courts.76  Ac-
cording to a well-established line of cases, some treaties signed by the United 
States are “self-executing” in nature, which means that they can be relied upon in 
U.S. courts without the need for any help from Congress.77  However, other trea-
                                                          
 69. See Anita Bernstein, Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 669, 673 n.29 (2009). A 
type of reverse preemption could arise under the New York Convention, to the extent Congress de-
clares a certain issue non-arbitrable and thus incapable of resolution under the convention. See New 
York Convention, supra note 43, art. II(1); Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 
907 (5th Cir. 2005); Stawski Distributing Co. v. Browary Zywiec S.A., 349 F.3d 1023, 1025-26 (7th 
Cir. 2003); Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When it is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1252 (2005); David A. Rich, Deference to the “Law of Nations”: The Intersec-
tion Between the New York Convention, the Convention Act, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and State 
Anti-Insurance Arbitration Statutes, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 81, 84 (2010). However, this phenome-
non has been traditionally discussed in the arbitration world as involving the principle of non-
arbitrability rather than preemption. See BORN, supra note 10, at 964-69. 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). 
 71. ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 72. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012). 
 73. See New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; Bernstein, supra note 69, at 673 
n.29; Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 514-21. 
 74. See 15 U.S.C § 1012(b) (2012). 
 75. See id.; ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 390. Because the McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in 
1945, it pre-dates Chapter 2 of the FAA and therefore cannot benefit from interpretive canons such as 
the last-in-time rule. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Ports-
mouth Settlement Co. I., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, 
at 515 n.85. 
 76. See Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 511-14. 
 77. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829), overruled on other grounds by Unit-
ed States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic 
Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 320 (1992); Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 
511-14; Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 578 (2007). The term “self-executing” has 
several meanings. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (7th ed. 2008). The issue involves the question of monism and 
dualism as principles of international law, although the U.S. concept of self-execution incorporates 
certain constitutional law issues into the analysis. See David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The 
Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135, 137-39 (2012) 
[hereinafter Sloss, Two-Step]; Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 511-14. 
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ties are “non-self-executing” and can only be given effect in U.S. courts to the 
extent the Congress has enacted what is known as “implementing” or “enabling 
legislation.”78 
Authorities agree that the judicial test for self-execution is extremely convo-
luted.79  The analysis is made even more confusing by virtue of the fact that a 
treaty may be self-executing as to some issues or for some purposes but not as to 
others.80  Interestingly, some of the more nuanced questions about self-execution 
have arisen in cases involving international insurance arbitration.81 
The debate about self-execution in the insurance context is based on language 
in the FAA indicating that the New York Convention “shall be enforced in United 
States courts in accordance with this chapter” (i.e., Chapter 2).82  On its face, this 
phrase seems to suggest that the New York Convention is non-self-executing, 
which could mean that the convention is reverse preempted by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.83  However, the language could also be read as simply referring to 
the various procedural features reflected in Chapter 2 of the FAA (for example, 
those relating to federal jurisdiction, venue, etc.) and indicating that those proce-
dural mechanisms were meant to be used in cases arising under the New York 
Convention.84  In many ways, this latter interpretation appears more correct as a 
matter of arbitration law, given that many countries that do not require enabling 
legislation to give domestic effect to international treaties have nevertheless 
adopted national legislation that is the functional equivalent of Chapter 2 of the 
FAA.85 
                                                          
 78. See Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 510-11, 546. 
 79. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-32 (2008); ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 388 (noting the 
question of self-execution is “murky”); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 
373 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing the test for self-execution as involving “several factors in discerning 
the intent of the parties to the agreement: (1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; 
(2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the 
agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implica-
tions of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dis-
pute”); Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 
540, 540 (2008); Sloss, Two-Step, supra note 77, at 135; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines 
of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995); Wu, supra note 77, at 578-79. 
 80. See Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 
455, 469 (2010); see also ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 387; Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwrit-
ers at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 732 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment) 
(suggesting that only Article II of the New York Convention should be considered self-executing), 
cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010). This bifurcated approach has been considered inappropriate as a 
matter of statutory construction. See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 108 
(2013) (discussing Chapter 1 of the FAA).   
 81. See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 387; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 732 (Clement, C.J., concurring in 
the judgment) (suggesting that only Article II of the New York Convention should be considered self-
executing). 
 82. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); see also New York Convention, supra note 43. The analysis would be 
the same under the Panama Convention. See Panama Convention, supra note 44; 9 U.S.C. § 301 
(2012). 
 83. See New York Convention, supra note 43; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). 
 84. See New York Convention, supra note 43; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; STRONG, GUIDE, supra 
note 10, at 15 (discussing the role of the FAA in international arbitration matters). 
 85. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 518. 
11
Strong: The Special Nature of International Insurance and Reinsurance Arb
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
294 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2015 
At this point, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed this issue directly.86  
However, the Court has occasionally suggested (ober dicta and in other contexts) 
that the New York Convention may be self-executing,87 although those statements 
were quite brief and have not been relied upon by lower courts.88 
More detailed analysis exists at the intermediate appellate level, although a 
rather significant circuit split has developed in recent years.89  Most district courts 
that have considered the question of self-execution have concluded that reverse 
preemption does not occur in cases falling under the New York Convention.90  
Although this Response does not seek to resolve this particular question, it is nev-
ertheless useful to outline the circuit court analyses so as to demonstrate the type 
                                                          
 86. Certiorari was sought on this issue in 2010 but was not granted. See La. Safety Ass’n of Tim-
bermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010) (regarding 
an insurance dispute). 
 87. See New York Convention, supra note 43. The Court noted in Medellin v. Texas (a non-
arbitration case) that Congress is up to the task of implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those 
involving complex commercial disputes. . . . The judgments of a number of international tribunals 
enjoy a different status because of implementing legislation enacted by Congress. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. 
§§201-08 (“The [U.N.] Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter,” §201). 
Such language demonstrates that Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international obli-
gations when it desires such a result. 
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521-22 (2009); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 
520 n.15 (1974) (noting that “Congress passed Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act [FAA] in 
order to implement the Convention,” although the Court did not decide whether the convention was 
self-executing). 
 88. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 722 (5th 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Un-
derwriters at Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010). But see id. at 733-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in 
the judgment). Lower federal courts have typically found a way to avoid the issue of self-execution. 
See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 2012); Lobo v. Celebrity Cruis-
es, Inc. 426 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (citing both the convention and the FAA), aff’d, 
488 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2007); Chloe Z Fishing Co. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 
1236, 1252-53 (S.D. Cal. 2000); In re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. 26, 30-31 (D.C.N.Y. 1974). 
 89. Although the Third Circuit has addressed this issue in passing, that analysis focused largely on 
issues relating to foreign sovereign immunity and is therefore not really relevant to this discussion. See 
Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting lack of reverse preemption); 
Zachary M. VanVactor, Comment, Three’s a Crowd: The Unhappy Interplay Among the New York 
Convention, the FAA, and McCarran-Ferguson Act, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 313, 327-29 (2011). The Sec-
ond Circuit has also considered the interplay between the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the New York 
Convention, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the FAA, again primarily in passing. 
See Stephens v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1231-34 (2d Cir. 1995); see also 
New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 
1602 (2012). 
 90. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Todd v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Assoc., Inc., 
No. 08-1195, 2011 WL 1226464, at *10 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011); Viator v. Dauterive Contractors, 
Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 641, 652 n.18 (E.D. La. 2009); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int’l Bus. Inc. Co., 
No. 07-CV-1071, 2007 WL 2752366, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007) (declining to follow the Second 
Circuit rule and noting “[t]he court finds more persuasive the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ statement 
that the New York Convention ‘must be enforced according to its terms over all prior inconsistent rules 
of law.’ This view is more in line with the New York Convention’s intended purpose and the Eighth 
Circuit’s strong language recognizing that ‘international comity is a fundamental principle deserving of 
substantial deference’”) (citations omitted); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I., 
466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of 
London, No. 96-4173-CV-C-2, 1996 WL 938126, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 10, 1996), appeal dismissed 
by 119 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Arbitration Between Engl. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n (Lux-
embourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992), 
appeal dismissed, 981 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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of complexity that can arise in disputes involving international insurance and rein-
surance arbitration.91 
The first decision in this line of cases was issued by the Second Circuit in 
1995 in Stephens v. American International Insurance Co.92  The opinion, which 
is extremely brief and conclusory, has won few adherents and was almost imme-
diately called into question by another panel sitting in the same circuit.93  In this 
opinion, the Second Circuit characterized Chapter 2 of the FAA as a type of im-
plementing legislation, which led to the determination that the New York Conven-
tion was not self-executing.94 
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit appears to have overlooked a 
number of salient issues, the most notable of which is the fact that the United 
States’ treaty obligations continue regardless of the status of the treaty within the 
domestic legal order.95  The court also relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
definition of a self-executing treaty in Foster v. Nielson, which was decided in 
1829.96  Although Foster remains good law, the Supreme Court has supplemented 
its understanding of self-execution in the years since Stephens was handed 
down,97 thereby diminishing any persuasive power Stephens might have.98 
                                                          
 91. Interestingly, this is the one area of international insurance arbitration that has attracted the 
attention of commentators. See Cindy Galway Buys & Grant Gorman, Movsesian v. Victoria Versi-
cherung and the Scope of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power to Preempt Words, 32 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 205, 219 (2012); Ronald G. Goss, Can State Laws Prevent International Arbitration of Insurance 
Disputes Under the 
New York Convention? 65 DISP. RESOL. J. 14, 93 (Nov. 2010–Jan. 2011); Joshua J. Newcomer, Inter-
national Decision, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 326, 326-32 (2011); Rich, supra note 69, at 84-86; Michael J. 
Ritter, Disputing Arbitration Clauses in International Insurance Agreements: Problems With the Self-
Execution Framework, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. 40, 41 (2012); Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 14-21; 
Aaron L. Wells, When “Yes” Means “No”: McCarran-Ferguson, the New York Convention, and the 
Limits of Congressional Assent, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 267, 297-98 (2012). 
 92. See Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); see also New York Convention, 
supra note 43. 
 93. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Stephens, 66 F.3d at 41; see also ESAB Group, 685 
F.3d at 385, 390-91 (claiming Stephens, 69 F.3d at 1226, called Stephens, 66 F.3d at 41, into question). 
 94. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45; see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 
313-14 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 
(1833). 
 95. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 726 n.53 
(5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010); BROWNLIE, supra note 77, at 34-35; LOUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 200 (2d ed. 1996); Jackson, 
supra note 77, at 313, 316-17; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 
26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (describing the duty of performance in good faith (pacta sunt 
servanda)). 
 96. Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45. Foster stated that 
[o]ur constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in 
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without 
the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract – 
when either of the parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the po-
litical, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can be-
come a rule for the court. 
Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. 
 97. See Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45; Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313-14; see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 
U.S. 491, 521-22 (2009); Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2868-71 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Noriega v. Pastrana, 559 U.S. 917, 917 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 436-37 (2006); Medellin v. Drake, 544 U.S. 660, 685-90 
(2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728, 735 (2004); Torres v. 
Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1035 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
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In 2009, the Fifth Circuit considered similar issues in Safety National Casual-
ty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London.99  The discussion was ex-
tremely robust and considered both the mandatory nature of the New York Con-
vention as well as the purpose of Chapter 2 of the FAA in giving effect to the 
convention.100 
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit was guided in part by the pro-arbitration poli-
cy enunciated in both the New York Convention and longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent.101  The Fifth Circuit was also influenced by the fact that Chapter 2 of 
the FAA serves a variety of purposes within the international arbitral regime, in-
cluding the creation of federal jurisdiction and the identification of an appropriate 
venue.102  This aspect of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis is important because it sug-
gests that Chapter 2 of the FAA does not necessarily constitute a form of imple-
menting legislation, at least in the traditional sense.103 
The Fifth Circuit also expanded on the concept of a self-executing treaty, par-
ticularly in the context of reverse preemption, stating that 
[e]ven if the [New York] Convention required legislation to implement 
some or all of its provisions in United States courts, that does not mean 
that Congress intended an “Act of Congress,” as that phrase is used in the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, to encompass a non-self-executing treaty that 
has been implemented by congressional legislation.  Implementing legis-
lation that does not conflict with or override a treaty does not replace or 
displace that treaty.  A treaty remains an international agreement or con-
tract negotiated by the Executive Branch and ratified by the Senate, not 
by Congress.  The fact that a treaty is implemented by Congress does not 
mean that it ceases to be a treaty and becomes an “Act of Congress.”104 
                                                          
 98. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722; id. at 737 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 99. See id. at 714. In 2010, the Fifth Circuit was presented with additional questions relating to the 
relationship between the New York Convention, the FAA, and the McCarran-Ferguson Act but de-
clined to address those matters and instead sent the issue to the district court on remand. See Todd v. 
Steamship Mut. Underwriting Assoc., Inc., 601 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2010), remanded, No. 08-1195, 
2011 WL 1226464, at *1139 (E.D. La. Mar. 28 2011). 
 100. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. II(1); 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); Safety Nat’l, 587 
F.3d at 719, 722, 725. 
 101. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 730; see also New York Convention, supra note 43; Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-39 (1985). A similar approach has 
been adopted at the district court level. See Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I., 
466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1303 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (concluding “that the Convention, and the strong 
international policy it expresses in favor of enforcing commercial arbitration agreements, supersedes 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act”); In re Arbitration Between England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n (Lux-
embourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992), 
appeal dismissed, 981 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 102. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 203-04 (2012); see Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722. The Fourth Circuit has 
taken what seems to be a similar view of Chapter 2, indicating that legislation was necessary as a 
means of addressing potential conflicts between Chapter 1 of the FAA and the New York Convention 
and “to aid in the enforcement of the Convention.” ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 
376, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing the various purposes of Chapter 2 of the FAA); see also New 
York Convention, supra note 43. 
 103. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722. 
 104. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722-23 (footnotes omitted). Similar conclusions have been reached in 
other contexts. See Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902-03 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that “[i]t goes without saying that, upon the United States signing a treaty and Congress adopt-
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This language has led some authorities to characterize Safety National as in-
dicating “that the provisions of a non-self-executing, implemented treaty ‘have 
full preemptive effect’” in the United States.105 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the fact that 
Chapter 2 of the FAA invokes rights arising out of the convention, which can be 
seen as directing the court to the convention itself.106  Furthermore, 
[w]hen Congress amended the FAA in 1970 to include provisions that 
dealt with the Convention, it provided in 9 U.S.C. §203, that “[a]n action 
or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise un-
der the laws and treaties of the United States.”  This is a direct indication 
that Congress thought that for jurisdictional purposes, an action falling 
under the Convention arose not only under the laws of the United States 
but also under treaties of the United States.107 
These factors led a majority of the Fifth Circuit to conclude that U.S. courts are 
empowered under Chapter 2 of the FAA to rely directly on the language of the 
New York Convention.108 
Although the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the self-executing nature of the New 
York Convention is quite detailed, the court did not ultimately decide the case on 
those grounds.109  Instead, Safety National turned on the court’s conclusion that 
the “commonly understood meaning of an ‘Act of Congress’ does not include a 
‘treaty,’ even if the treaty required implementing legislation.”110  Under this inter-
pretive approach, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply in cases where the 
language of the convention itself is being construed.111 
                                                          
ing enabling legislation, the treaty becomes the supreme law of the land” (citing Sedco, Inc. v. Petrole-
os Mexicanos Mexican Nat. Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Prokopeva v. 
Carnival Corp., No. C-08-213, 2008 WL 4276975, at *3 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2008); Matter of 
Arbitration Between England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91 – 3645, 1992 
WL 37700 at *4. Some courts go even further. See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Inc., 969 
F.3d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting “ratification of the Convention makes it part of the supreme law 
of the land, as enforceable as Congressional enactments”); Clow v. Ins. Corp. of British Columbia, No. 
07-403-ST, 2007 WL 2292689, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2007); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. R&S Co., 176 F. 
Supp. 2d 935, 938 (D. Minn. 2001); Filanto, S.p.A., v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1236 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed by 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.1993) (though also noting a role for the 
FAA). 
 105. See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 386 (quoting Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 733 (Clement, C.J., concur-
ring in the judgment)). 
 106. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724-25, 727-28; see also New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 
U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2012). 
 107. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430-32 (1920). 
 108. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724-25, 727-28; see also id. at 734 (Clement, 
C.J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the language of Article II(3) of the New York Convention is 
addressed directly at the courts themselves). Interestingly, this approach appears very similar to the 
borrowed treaty rule. See infra notes 133-82 and accompanying text. 
 109. See New York Convention, supra note 43; ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 385. 
 110. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 723 (concluding “[i]t would seem that “treaty” would include all im-
plemented treaties, regardless of whether they were self-executing or had required implementing 
legislation”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012); ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 385. 
 111. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 723; ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 385. 
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In addition to the majority holding, Safety National generated both concurring 
and dissenting opinions.112  The concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Clement 
suggested that the New York Convention should be considered self-executing, at 
least with respect to Article II, which is the section of the convention that discuss-
es the mandatory duty to compel arbitration in cases falling under the conven-
tion.113  In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Clement focused on the way in which 
Article II(3) of the convention speaks directly to the courts of a state party, rather 
than to the state party itself.114 
Because Judge Clement explicitly considered the issue of self-execution in 
her concurrence, she was forced to consider dicta from the U.S. Supreme Court 
suggesting that the New York Convention is non-self-executing.115  Judge Clem-
ent overcame that obstacle by concluding that the Supreme Court was referring to 
Article III, rather than Article II, of the convention.116  While this approach may 
make some sense given the language of the convention, commentators have noted 
the incongruity of giving different effects to different parts of a single legal in-
strument.117 
Safety National also included a dissenting opinion that took the view that the 
New York Convention was a non-self-executing treaty and therefore had no place 
in the national legal order.118  In reaching this conclusion, the dissent suggested 
that only the implementing legislation (i.e., Chapter 2 of the FAA) had preemptive 
effect.119  Because Chapter 2 constitutes an “Act of Congress,” the dissent con-
cluded that Chapter 2 could be reverse preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act.120  However, this approach failed to convince the rest of the judges on the 
panel. 
                                                          
 112. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 732 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 737 (Elrod, 
J., dissenting). 
 113. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. II; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 733-34 (Clement, 
C.J., concurring the judgment); see also ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 387. 
 114. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 115. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521-22 (2009); 
Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 116. See New York Convention, supra note 43, arts. II-III; Medellin, 552 U.S. at 521-22; Safety 
Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also ESAB Group, 685 F.3d 
at 387. Article III of the New York Convention states: 
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accord-
ance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the condi-
tions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous 
conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to 
which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards. 
New York Convention, supra note 43, art. III. Article II(3), on the other hand, indicates that “[t]he 
court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which have made an 
agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties 
to arbitration . . . .” Id. art. II(3). 
 117. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 80, at 108 (discussing Chapter 1 of the FAA). 
 118. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Safety Nat’l., 587 F.3d at 748 (Elrod, C.J., dissent-
ing). 
 119. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 748 (Elrod, C.J., dissenting); see also New York Convention, supra 
note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). 
 120. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 752 (Elrod, C.J., dissenting); see also New York Convention, supra 
note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
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The final federal appellate court decision in this area of law was handed down 
in 2012.121  In ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, the Fourth Circuit joined the 
Fifth Circuit in concluding that the FAA and New York Convention are not re-
verse preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.122  The two circuit court anal-
yses are in many ways similar, with the Fourth Circuit also deciding the dispute as 
a matter of statutory rather than constitutional law.123 
In ESAB Group, the Fourth Circuit took the view that “Supreme Court prece-
dent dictates that McCarran-Ferguson is limited to legislation within the domestic 
realm,” which eliminates any need to even consider the question of reverse 
preemption.124  This conclusion was based on cases indicating that “courts should 
be most cautious before interpreting . . . domestic legislation in such a manner as 
to violate international agreements.”125  The Fourth Circuit was further persuaded 
that a broad reading of McCarran-Ferguson was inappropriate in light of the broad 
U.S. policy in favor of international arbitration.126  Indeed, the court held that, 
with the adoption of the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA, “the 
government has opted . . . to articulate a uniform policy in favor of enforcing 
agreements to arbitrate internationally, even when ‘a contrary result would be 
forthcoming in a domestic context.’”127  As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that 
“Congress did not intend for the McCarran-Ferguson Act to permit state law to 
vitiate international agreements entered by the United States.”128 
As this brief discussion has shown, the law regarding the relationship be-
tween the New York Convention, the FAA and the McCarran-Ferguson Act is 
largely unsettled.129  Overall, the Fifth and Fourth Circuit opinions appear to be 
more consistent with well-established principles of international and arbitration 
law than the Second Circuit opinion, which suggests that the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act will not apply to matters involving international insurance and reinsurance 
arbitration.130  However, there are some additional arguments in favor of reverse 
preemption that may nevertheless arise in the coming years.131 
                                                          
 121. See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 390-91. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. at 388, 390-91; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). For example, the Fourth Circuit – like the 
Fifth Circuit before it – did not decide the issue of whether the New York Convention is self-executing 
in whole or in part. See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 385, 387-88; see also Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722-
23. Instead, the Fourth Circuit characterized the question of self-execution of the New York Conven-
tion as “murky” and gave no real clues as to how it would decide these issues. ESAB Group, 685 F.3d 
at 388; see also New York Convention, supra note 43. 
 124. ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 388. 
 125. Id. (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995)). 
 126. See id. at 390 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
639 (1985)). 
 127. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 629). 
 128. Id. at 388-9 (relying on Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428 (2003)). 
 129. See New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); ESAB 
Group, 685 F.3d at 388-90; Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 
F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010); Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 
41 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 130. See New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); ESAB 
Group, 685 F.3d at 388-90; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 714; Stephens, 66 F.3d at 41. 
 131. There are also additional arguments in favor of the non-applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). For example, some insurance law experts have suggested other possible 
arguments, including those alleging that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not affect Congressional 
powers under anything other than the Commerce Clause. See id.; Raymond A. Guenter, Rediscovering 
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One such argument might claim that insurance disputes do not fall within the 
scope of the New York Convention, based on the longstanding practice of distin-
guishing insurance disputes from other types of commercial matters132 and the fact 
that the United States entered a declaration under the New York Convention limit-
ing the treaty to “commercial” matters.133  Although this argument may appear 
persuasive on some levels, it is unlikely to prevail given the extremely broad way 
that the term “commercial” has been defined as a matter of both arbitration and 
constitutional law.134  Furthermore, the mere fact that an arbitration agreement or 
award does not fall within the scope of the New York Convention does not make 
the agreement or award unenforceable.135  Instead, the parties simply rely on 
longstanding common law methods of enforcing the agreement or award.136 
This latter mechanism also leads to some potential problems as a result of re-
cent commentary suggesting that foreign arbitral awards not falling under the New 
York Convention should be considered pursuant to Chapter 1 of the FAA (a move 
that would result in reverse preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act).137  
However, older and more established authorities take the view that “[f]oreign 
arbitral awards not falling under the Convention are generally enforceable in the 
United States in the same manner as foreign judgments . . . .”138  Since enforce-
ment of foreign judgments is largely governed by state law, the question of re-
verse preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act would not arise.139 
                                                          
the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Commerce Clause Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 263, 312 (1999-2000) 
(suggesting the “preemption provision of Section 2(b) should be applied only to federal commerce 
clause laws”). This argument would exempt matters involving arbitration pursuant to a treaty, since the 
treaty-making power is not part of the Commerce Clause. Compare U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 with 
id. art. I, § 10. 
 132. The doctrine has a somewhat convoluted history in the United States. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 
U.S. 168 (1868), overruled in part by United States v. S.-E. Underwriters’ Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 
(1944), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12; Jeffrey E. Thomas, Insurance Law Between 
Business Law and Consumer Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 353, 353 (2010). Other countries appear to 
retain this distinction, at least in some regards. See Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), para. 18, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (distinguishing 
insurance law); Helmut Heiss, Towards a European Insurance Contract Law: Restatement – Common 
Frame of Reference – Optional Instrument?, 7-8 (distinguishing insurance contracts from other types 
of contracts), http://www.aidahungary.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/AIDA2006_11_24_Helmut_Heiss_eloadas.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). 
 133. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. I(3); New York Convention Status, supra note 
45. 
 134. See Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 536 (noting “the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
. . . is broadly construed as a matter of both constitutional and arbitral law”); see also U.S. Const., art. 
I, §8, cl. 3; Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-19 (2001). As a result, disputes 
involving international insurance and reinsurance would likely fall within the scope of the New York 
Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 43. 
 135. See New York Convention, supra note 43. 
 136. See Weizmann Inst. of Sci. v. Neschis, 421 F. Supp. 2d 654, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (involving an 
award made in a country that had not joined the New York Convention). 
 137. See BORN, supra note 10, at 156 (referring to the draft Restatement of the U.S. Law of Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration); see also New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 
(2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
 138. Weizmann Inst., 421 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (citing authorities); BORN, supra note 10, at 156; 
STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 30. 
 139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); BORN, supra note 10, at 163; S.I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 56 (2014); see 
also supra note 55 and accompanying text (regarding state law on international commercial arbitra-
tion). 
18
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2015, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2015/iss2/4
No. 2] A Response to Professor Jerry 301 
Another possible argument focuses on Article V(2)(b) of the New York Con-
vention, which allows courts to refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on 
the grounds of public policy.140  Given the importance of public policy in insur-
ance law, some parties might claim that the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows indi-
vidual U.S. states to implement their own individual public policies regarding 
insurance law, which should include matters with international connections.141  
However, this argument is extremely problematic given language from the U.S. 
Supreme Court indicating that the United States needs to speak with “one voice” 
regarding matters involving foreign relations142 and longstanding precedent hold-
ing that the public policy exception under the New York Convention is very nar-
rowly drawn and largely dependent on questions of international public policy.143 
As this brief introduction has shown, questions relating to international insur-
ance and reinsurance arbitration can be quite complicated.  Furthermore, given the 
importance of the international insurance market to U.S. commercial interests,144 it 
appears likely that the Supreme Court will need to address the growing circuit 
split at some point in the relatively near future.145  The Court’s efforts in this re-
gard would be significantly aided if there were more high-quality commentary in 
this field, as Professor Jerry has suggested.146 
IV. INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE ARBITRATION – 
TENSIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND FOREIGN LAW 
As intriguing as conflicts between international and U.S. constitutional law 
may be, such issues arise relatively infrequently.147  The more common concern in 
international insurance and reinsurance arbitration involves the tension between 
U.S. and foreign law.148 
Conflict of laws questions arise with some frequency in insurance disputes, 
although most cases focus on the applicability of the laws of different U.S. states 
                                                          
 140. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. V(2)(b). 
 141. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
 142. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that “[i]n 
our dealings with the outside world the United States speaks with one voice and acts as one, unembar-
rassed by the complications as to domestic issues which are inherent in the distribution of political 
power between the national government and the individual states”); see also ESAB Group, Inc. v. 
Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Pink in the international insurance context). 
 143. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 84; see also infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text 
(discussing the need to rely on international, not domestic, public policy). 
 144. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 3 (2015) (suggesting 
that 62% of U.S. insurance premiums were ceded to offshore companies, although that number rises to 
92% if the fact that many U.S. reinsurers are owned by foreign companies is taken into account). 
 145. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 279 (regarding the size of the international insurance market); see also 
supra note 89-143 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 279-280. 
 147. Arbitration can only generate conflicts between international and constitutional law in cases 
where a party seeks to enforce an international arbitration agreement or award in the United States, and 
most parties comply voluntarily with such agreements and awards. See New York Convention, supra 
note 43, arts. II-III; BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 11.02; see also Masters, supra note 17, at *14 
(noting that most parties to international insurance disputes used to simply settle their cases). 
 148. See Masters, supra note 17, at *5 (noting the need to compare “the different regulatory or na-
tional environments” in which an insured operates to understand scope of coverage and related issues). 
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rather than the laws of different countries.149  Some distinction can also be made 
with respect to the type of legal tension that arises in international and domestic 
matters.  For example, in interstate disputes, the conflict is between two different 
sources of substantive law (since the procedural law is always supplied by the 
forum),150 while in international disputes the tension is between substantive and 
procedural law. 
The best way to illustrate these types of concerns is by putting the discussion 
into context.  One excellent example involves arbitration under the Bermuda 
Form, which is a popular type of excess insurance policy featuring an innovative 
dispute resolution mechanism that has been widely copied.151 
The Bermuda Form was developed in the mid-1980s as a result of the world-
wide “‘tort-insurance’ crisis” which saw the number and type of tort claims ex-
panding at such a rate and to such an extent that liability insurance was only 
“available, if at all, at high premiums and with numerous exclusions.”152  The 
crisis generated a number of different national responses, although 
the response of the United States was of an entirely different order.  A se-
ries of cases in the 1980s established that liability policies which covered 
personal injury property damage occurring during their currency were re-
quired to respond on a “continuous” or “triple trigger” basis.  The most 
important of those cases, involving liability for injuries resulting from 
exposure to asbestos, was Keene Corp v Insurance Co of North America 
667 F. 2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which held that a liability policy in 
force on any of exposure, injury or manifestation of injury was required 
to respond, and that each insurer faced joint and several liability.  (These 
rulings are still impacting on the English reinsurance market . . . .) It be-
came all but impossible for US manufacturing companies to obtain insur-
ance at affordable rates.  This led to an initiative spearheaded by leading 
brokers, banks and insurers to establish and capitalise two new insurers, 
Ace and XL, to act as high-level excess-layer insurers.  The new compa-
nies were located in Bermuda, and policy wordings were developed to 
ensure that appropriate coverage was provided.  Those wordings, . . . 
have changed over time but . . . have become known as the Bermuda 
Form.153 
                                                          
 149. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (considering a conflict between Wisconsin 
and Minnesota law); Main, supra note 67, at 600 (suggesting that the case required the U.S. Supreme 
Court to consider “the principal constitutional underpinnings of conflicts doctrine, namely the Due 
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses”). 
 150. See S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1027, 1030 (2014). 
 151. See Masters, supra note 17, at *14; McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2 (noting that “excess and 
surplus lines of insurance” cover specialized risks and are generally individually negotiated); see also 
supra note 19 and accompanying text (defining excess liability insurance). 
 152. Rob Merkin, Book Review, Liability Insurance in International Arbitration: The Bermuda 
Form, 2 J. BUS. L. 161, 161 (2012). 
 153. Id. (citations omitted).  The English insurance and reinsurance market is expected to change 
radically, including with respect to dispute resolution matters, as a result of the English Insurance Act 
2015, which comes into effect in August 2016.  See Holman Fenwick Willan, DISP. RESOL. BULL., 2-3 
(July 2015), available at http://www.hfw.com/downloads/HFW-Dispute-Resolution-Bulletin-July-
2015.pdf. 
20
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2015, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2015/iss2/4
No. 2] A Response to Professor Jerry 303 
As this passage suggests, the Bermuda Form focuses on liability for large-
scale, catastrophic loss such as that arising out of mass tort scenarios.154  The 
Bermuda Form was in many ways revolutionary155 and attempts to provide a rela-
tively balanced approach to the interests of policyholders and investors while also 
avoiding various substantive problems associated with traditional modes of insur-
ance coverage.156 
Although the Bermuda Form has been adapted a number of times over the 
years, certain core attributes have remained constant.157  For example, the Bermu-
da Form operates as a single contract rather than a series of annual contracts, with 
an “occurrence” under the Form arising upon the first claim from a policyhold-
er.158 
As interesting as these and other substantive features are, the most intriguing 
point for the purposes of the current discussion involves the way in which the 
Bermuda Form splits jurisdictional competency over matters of procedural and 
substantive law.159  In particular, the Bermuda Form requires the substantive dis-
pute to be decided pursuant to a modified version of New York law, but requires 
the matter to be heard by arbitration seated in London and governed by the Eng-
lish Arbitration Act 1996.160  Thus, the arbitration provision found in most the 
recent iteration of the Bermuda Form (Form XL XS-004) indicates that 
[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Poli-
cy or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof shall be finally and ful-
ly determined in London, England under the provisions of the Arbitration 
Acts of 1950, 1975 and 1979 and/or any statutory modifications or 
amendments thereto, for the time being in force, by a Board composed of 
three arbitrators to be selected for each controversy as follows . . . .161 
Form XL XS-004 also states that 
This Policy, and any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relat-
ing to this Policy, shall be governed by and construed in accordance with 
the internal laws of the State of New York, except insofar as such laws: 
                                                          
 154. See RICHARD JACOBS ET AL., LIABILITY INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE 
BERMUDA FORM 1 (2004); see also DAVID SCOREY ET AL., THE BERMUDA FORM: INTERPRETATION 
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF EXCESS LIABILITY INSURANCE (2011); Thomas Brusstar et al., Key 
Issues in Bermuda Form Arbitrations, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGATION 
INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION COMMITTEE (Mar. 5, 2011), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/docs/2011-cle-materials/17-
KeyIssuesBermudaArbitration/17a_Key_Issues_In_Bermuda-Form_Arbitrations.pdf. 
 155. See John Fellas, International Arbitration Under the Bermuda Form, 8 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 129, 
132 (2014). 
 156. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 12-14. 
 157. See Merkin, supra note 152, at 161. 
 158. See Fellas, supra note 155, at 132.  
 159. See id. 
 160. See Arbitration Act 1996 (Eng.); JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 16-17; Fellas, supra note 
155, at 132.  
 161. Fellas, supra note 155, at 132-33 (quoting article VI.N(1) of Bermuda Form XL XS-004); see 
also C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 [2] (Eng.) (quoting portions of the conditions section of a Ber-
muda Form policy dealing with arbitration). 
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(1) may prohibit payment in respect of punitive damages 
hereunder; 
(2) pertain to regulation under the New York Insurance Law, 
or regulations issued by the Insurance Department of the State of 
New York pursuant thereto, applying to insurers doing insurance 
business, or issuance, delivery or procurement of policies of insur-
ance, within the State of New York or as respects risks or insureds 
situated in the State of New York; or 
(3) are inconsistent with any provisions of this Policy; 
provided, however, that the provisions, stipulations, exclusions and con-
ditions of this Policy are to be construed in an evenhanded fashion as be-
tween the Insured and the Insurer; without limitation, where the language 
of this Policy is deemed to be ambiguous or otherwise unclear, the issue 
shall be resolved in the manner most consistent with the relevant provi-
sions, stipulations, exclusions and conditions (without regard to author-
ship of the language, without any presumption or arbitrary interpretation 
or construction in favor of either the Insured or the Insurer or reference to 
the “reasonable expectations” of either thereof or to contra proforentem 
and without reference to parole or other extrinsic evidence). To the extent 
that New York law is inapplicable by virtue of any exception or proviso 
enumerated above or otherwise, and as respects arbitration procedure 
pursuant to Condition N, the internal laws of England and Wales shall 
apply.162 
Arbitration and choice of law provisions in other Bermuda Forms feature 
slightly different language but establish the same basic structure.163  Notably, this 
split between procedural and substantive competence has been adopted in other 
types of international insurance and reinsurance matters.164 
The developers of the Bermuda Form adopted this type of dual competency 
for very specific reasons.  First, adoption of an even-handed approach to resolu-
tion of the substantive dispute was vital to widespread acceptance of the Bermuda 
Form, and New York law was thought to be relatively neutral as between insurers 
and policyholders.165  Second, developers of the Bermuda Form wanted to protect 
the procedural process from judicial interference as much as possible, and London 
was known as one of the best jurisdictions for arbitration, even in the 1980s.166  
                                                          
 162. Fellas, supra note 155, at 134-35 (quoting article VI.O of Bermuda Form XL XS-004); see also 
C, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 at [2] (quoting portions of the conditions section of a Bermuda Form 
policy dealing with governing law). 
 163. Fellas, supra note 155, at 133. Notably, Form XL XS-004 and similar forms incorporate the 
Arbitration Act 1996 through language referring to “any statutory modifications or amendments there-
to.”  Id.  See Arbitration Act 1996 (Eng.); JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 30, 272. Some policies 
indicate that Bermuda is another possible situs for the arbitration. See Dolin & Posner, supra note 38, 
at 79. 
 164. See Masters, supra note 17, at *14. 
 165. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 16-17. 
 166. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration-Friendliness: Promises of Principle and Realities of Practice, 23 
ARB. INT’L 477, 477-78 (2007).  Although English courts were not as supportive of international arbi-
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Another more pragmatic consideration involved the fact that a significant number 
of entities involved in the excess insurance market (including, most notably, 
Lloyd’s) were based in London and would benefit from a rule requiring local pro-
ceedings.167 
Although this sort of split competency may have been somewhat unusual at 
the time the Bermuda Form was initially developed, the practice of separating 
procedural and substantive law has become quite common in international arbitra-
tion.168  Indeed, the principle of party autonomy has developed to the point where 
parties to international arbitration are free not only to have their substantive dis-
putes governed by a national law different than that of the country where the arbi-
tration is seated, but also to have their substantive disputes governed by general 
principles of commercial or international law rather than the law of a particular 
country.169 
Although the Bermuda Form’s dispute resolution mechanism is not problem-
atic from a jurisprudential perspective,170 certain practical issues can arise as a 
result of the split of jurisdictional competency.171  For example, Bermuda Form 
arbitrations give rise to a number of conflict of laws concerns, including those 
relating to: 
 the law governing the interpretation of the arbitration agreement 
(generally accepted to be English law pursuant to the leading deci-
sion of C v. D);172 
                                                          
tration in the 1980s as they are now, the development of arbitration law in England at that time was 
nevertheless far ahead of that of United States. See BORN, supra note 10, at 35-39, 41-50. For example, 
in the 1980s U.S. courts were still considering whether “manifest disregard” of the law could operate 
as a means of overturning awards rendered or enforced in the United States. See id. at 159. 
 167. See Dolin & Posner, supra note 38, at 70 n.5 (noting that ACE, one of the entities responsible 
for developing the Bermuda Form, includes a British subsidiary (ACE UK) that was at one time “the 
largest managing agency at Lloyd’s”); see also ACE Global Markets, ACE GROUP, 
http://www.acegroup.com/uk-en/about-ace-in-the-uk/ace-global-markets.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 
2015) (noting ACE is currently the managing agency of Syndicate 2488 at Lloyd’s); About Lloyds, 
LLOYDS, https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (describing function of Lloyd’s). 
 168. Such mechanisms are more problematic in litigation. See Marta Pertegás & Brooke Adele Mar-
shall, Party Autonomy and Its Limits: Convergence Through the New Hague Principles on Choice of 
Law in International Commercial Contracts, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 975, 995-1002 (2014). Parties in 
international arbitration may also have a bit more flexibility with respect to the application of mandato-
ry principles of law, although such laws may not be evaded altogether. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See BORN, supra note 10, at 473. 
 171. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 29-43. 
 172. See C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 [16] (Eng.). The question of which law governs the inter-
pretation of the arbitration agreement is different than the question of which law governs the merits of 
the dispute or which law controls arbitral procedure. See BORN, supra note 10, at 473-74. When seek-
ing to identify the law that governed the interpretation of the arbitration provision in C v. D (a Bermu-
da Form case), the English Court of Appeal 
concluded that whilst it was possible to find examples of a situation where the law governing the 
arbitration agreement was different from the law of the place where the reference was conducted, 
it would be a rare case in which those two systems of law were not the same. This was because 
an agreement to arbitrate will normally have a closer and more real connection with the place 
chosen as the seat of the arbitration than the place of the law governing the underlying contract. 
However, agreeing with the approach of Cooke J. [below], the Court of Appeal emphasised that 
these general factors were less important than the indications to be found in the terms of the arbi-
tration agreement itself. The provisions of the arbitration clause identified by Cooke J. as indicat-
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 the law governing the internal processes of the arbitration (deter-
mined to be English law pursuant to the explicit language of the 
Bermuda Form, although arbitrators wield a great deal of discretion 
in matters of procedure);173 
 the law governing choice of law concerns (generally deemed to be 
English law);174 
 the law governing the substantive dispute (determined to be modi-
fied New York law pursuant to the explicit language of the Bermuda 
Form, but with some concerns, such as the extent to which the Ber-
muda Form purports to exclude various regulatory laws and public 
policies regarding the interpretation of the Bermuda Form);175 
 the law governing the underlying insurance claim (which can in-
volve jurisdictions other than England or New York);176 and 
 the division between procedural law and substantive law, particular-
ly with respect to issues relating to the burden of proof, contract in-
terpretation, various types of estoppel, statutes of limitation, reme-
dies, costs and attorneys’ fees, and legal privilege.177 
These types of questions are routine in other types of international commer-
cial arbitration and therefore raise few questions within the international arbitral 
community.178  However, parties and practitioners who specialize in domestic 
insurance do not routinely face these types of issues.  This lack of familiarity with 
standard international procedural and conflict of laws concerns can lead to unwar-
ranted criticism of international insurance and reinsurance arbitration on both a 
practical and jurisprudential level.179 
                                                          
ing a desire by the parties for the finality of any award would be rendered meaningless if either 
party could instigate review proceedings in the court of New York, and this was a strong pointer 
towards English law being the applicable law. For these reasons, D’s contention that the law of 
New York governed the agreement to arbitrate was again rejected. 
David Foster, C v D: The English Court of Appeal Upholds an Anti-Suit Injunction in Support of Arbi-
tral Proceedings, 11 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 104, 108 (2008); see also C, [2007] EWCA Civ. at 1282. 
Notably, the fact that both parties in C v. D were U.S. corporations did not affect the English Court of 
Appeal’s determination. See id.; Hew R. Dundas, C v D: The USA Conquers England – Or Does It? 
The Law of the Arbitration Agreement, Challenges to Awards, and Abuse of Process, 73 ARB. 431, 439 
(2007). 
 173. See BORN, supra note 10, at 2123; Robert W. DiUbaldo, Evolving Issues in Reinsurance Dis-
putes: The Power of Arbitrators, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 84 (2008) (discussing arbitral discretion 
in the area of reinsurance arbitration). 
 174. English choice of law rules may differ than those applicable in the United States. See JACOBS ET 
AL., supra note 154, at 32-33; Masters, supra note 17, at *3-4. 
 175. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 33-36. 
 176. See id. at 36-37. 
 177. See id. at 43-50, 308-33.  
 178. See BORN, supra note 10, at 472-635. 
 179. See DiUbaldo, supra note 173, at 84; Masters, supra note 17, at *4, 15. Arbitration under the 
Bermuda Form also departs from established insurance law in some substantive regards, although that 
issue is beyond the scope of the current discussion. See Fellas, supra note 155, at 134-35 (noting that 
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A lack of understanding of the standard norms of international arbitration can 
also lead to expensive and unnecessary litigation.  For example, a dispute arose 
recently as to which court has proper jurisdiction over matters ancillary to a Ber-
muda Form arbitration – the court in London, which was where the arbitration was 
seated, or the court in New York, which was the place of the law governing the 
substantive dispute.180  The question was addressed by the English Court of Ap-
peal in the context of an application for an anti-suit injunction seeking to halt the 
judicial proceedings in New York.181  In its decision, the English Court of Appeal 
indicated that English courts retain curial jurisdiction over all Bermuda Form 
arbitrations, stating 
that the central point at issue was whether or not, by choosing London as 
the seat of the arbitration and consequently English law as the law appli-
cable to the conduct of the arbitration, the parties must be taken to have 
agreed that proceedings to challenge or review the award should be 
those, and only those, permitted by English law. The Court of Appeal 
held that the parties must be taken to have agreed this, largely adopting 
the reasoning of Cooke J. [below]. 
The whole purpose behind the Bermuda Form, according to the 
Court, with its dispute resolution procedure providing for English arbitra-
tion applying New York’s substantive law to issues arising under the pol-
icy, was that judicial remedies in respect of the award should be those al-
lowed by the Arbitration Act 1996, and nothing more.  If New York judi-
cial remedies were to be imported into this scheme, that would . . . be a 
recipe for confusion which could not have been intended by the parties.  
The agreement on the seat of an arbitration was analogous to an exclu-
sive jurisdiction clause, and any claim for a remedy going to the exist-
ence or scope of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, or the validity of an interim 
or final award, should only be made in the courts of the place specified as 
a seat of the arbitration. C was accordingly entitled to the permanent anti-
suit injunction restraining D from initiating proceedings in the US 
courts.182 
This determination is consistent with the standard understanding of jurisdic-
tional competence in international commercial arbitration, which gives courts at 
                                                          
questions of privilege may be applied differently in Bermuda Form arbitration, since insurers do not 
have a duty to defend the policyholder under the Bermuda Form). 
 180. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 29. 
 181. The suit in New York involved a challenge to a partial award for manifest disregard of New 
York law. See C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 (Eng.); see also C v. D, [2007] EWHC 1541 [12] – 
[13] (Comm) (Eng.). The application to the New York court faced a number of difficulties, including 
(1) the fact that it was a partial, as opposed to a final, award; (2) the fact that it alleged the arbitration 
was outside the scope of the New York Convention; and (3) the fact that it sought to invoke the con-
cept of “manifest disregard of law,” which has been determined to be largely, if not entirely, inapplica-
ble in matters involving international arbitration. See id.; see also STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 
62-63 (regarding problems enforcing partial awards); id. at 28-29 (regarding the scope of the New 
York Convention, including in matters arising entirely between U.S. parties); id. at 85 (regarding 
“manifest disregard” in cases involving foreign arbitral awards). 
 182. Foster, supra note 172, at 106; see also C, [2007] EWCA Civ. at 1282. 
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the seat of arbitration the exclusive power to hear certain matters that arise before, 
during and after the arbitral proceedings.183  However, parties to international 
disputes are becoming increasingly litigious, and C v. D may herald a more con-
tentious era in Bermuda Form arbitration.184 
The outcome in C v. D does not suggest that the courts of New York or any 
other U.S. jurisdiction cannot ever be implicated in Bermuda Form disputes.185  
According to well-established principles of international arbitration law, a party 
who prevails in a Bermuda Form arbitration in London may bring an action in the 
United States to recognize or enforce the arbitral award.186  U.S. courts may 
properly accept jurisdiction over this type of matter, a feature that is important in 
addressing certain doubts about the propriety of Bermuda Form disputes, since 
this procedure allows a non-prevailing party to resist enforcement proceedings.187  
Although the party objecting to a Bermuda Form award in a New York court may 
only do so on a limited number of grounds established as a matter of international 
law, the states parties to the New York Convention have agreed that this approach 
is both fair and appropriate.188 
One of the most common criticisms of Bermuda Form arbitration involves the 
apparent lack of judicial scrutiny of the merits of the award due to the absence of 
an appellate mechanism.189  Although the English Arbitration Act 1996 does allow 
for substantive appeals in certain circumstances, that provision only applies to 
points of English law, which means that it is inapplicable in Bermuda Form cases, 
which are governed by foreign (i.e., New York) law.190  Appeals to English courts 
are also prohibited as a matter of contract under policies that explicitly waive the 
right to an appeal under the Arbitration Act 1996.191 
                                                          
 183. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 33-36 (discussing principle of primary jurisdiction and 
secondary jurisdiction); see also C, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 at [17] (analogizing the choice of the 
arbitral seat as akin to an exclusive jurisdiction provision). The court at the seat also has the exclusive 
power to annul or set aside the award. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 34. However, any court 
in the world has the ability to recognize or enforce an arbitral award once it has been rendered, even if 
the award has been annulled or set aside by a court at the seat. See id.; see also New York Convention, 
supra note 43, art. V(1)(e). 
 184. See Masters, supra note 17, at *14 (noting that whereas parties to a Bermuda Form dispute used 
to simply settle their cases, they are now going through with arbitration); S.I. Strong, Increasing Legal-
ism in International Commercial Arbitration: A New Theory of Causes, A New Approach to Cures, 7 
WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 117, 117 (2013) (noting an increase in litigiousness of international com-
mercial arbitration as a general matter). 
 185. See C, [2007] EWCA Civ. at 1282. 
 186. Enforcement proceedings in a foreign state are seldom required, since the vast majority of par-
ties comply voluntarily with international awards. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 11.02. 
However, a party may bring enforcement proceedings in any state it wishes. See STRONG, GUIDE, 
supra note 10, at 33. 
 187. Other jurisdictional requirements must still be met. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 35-36. 
 188. See New York Convention, supra note 43, arb. V; see also infra notes 218-38 and accompany-
ing text. Non-prevailing parties cannot bring an affirmative action to annul an arbitral award in any 
country other than the arbitral seat. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 34. 
 189. Some commentators claim this approach “disadvantages policyholders who do not engage in 
these kinds of arbitrations regularly.” Masters, supra note 17, at *16. Similar concerns are occasionally 
raised in other types of international commercial arbitration. See Irene M. Ten Cate, International 
Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1109, 1111 (2012). 
 190. See Arbitration Act 1996 § 69 (Eng.); see also JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 15 (noting also 
that this provision is similar to that developed as a matter of case law under section 1 of the Arbitration 
Act 1975). 
 191. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 15 n.44. 
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These provisions have effectively precluded the appeal of any Bermuda Form 
arbitration, which means that there are essentially no judicial decisions relating to 
the substantive provisions of a standard Bermuda Form policy.  Indeed, the only 
two Bermuda Form cases to have ever reached the English courts are C v. D, 
which addressed choice of law and jurisdictional issues,192 and AstraZeneca In-
surance Co. v. XL Insurance Co., which involved a somewhat unusual policy that 
was governed by English rather than New York law and that allowed judicial 
determination of any disputes that arose between the parties.193 
The lack of judicial scrutiny of Bermuda Form arbitration has met with a 
mixed reception.  For example, some commentators have praised the Bermuda 
Form process for fostering finality and avoiding the awkwardness of asking an 
English court to take responsibility for determining and applying New York 
law.194  However, other observers have criticized Bermuda Form arbitration as 
hindering the development of the law195 and insulating important matters of public 
policy from public view.196 
In many ways, these criticisms appear off-point.197  For example, concerns 
about the development of the law appear to suggest that the absence of judicial 
consideration of Bermuda Form arbitration precludes the possibility of “uniformi-
ty and predictability in interpretation of policies and contracts.”198  In fact, the 
history of Bermuda Form arbitration suggests that this type of consistency does in 
fact exist, largely as a result of the small, close-knit nature of the insurance arbi-
tration world.199  Furthermore, while arbitral awards do not constitute formal prec-
edent, they are often highly persuasive to other tribunals, particularly on matters 
of procedural law, and are published far more frequently than non-specialists real-
ize.200  Finally, the continuing use of Bermuda Form arbitration suggests that arbi-
                                                          
 192. See C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 (Eng.). 
 193. See AstraZeneca Ins. Co., Ltd. v. XL Ins. Co., Ltd., [2013] EWCA Civ. 1660 [8] (Eng.). As a 
result, AstraZeneca cannot be considered an arbitration case. See id.; see also Masters, supra note 17, 
at *15-16 (discussing the trial court opinion rather than the Court of Appeal decision). 
 194. See also Dundas, supra note 172, at 439 (discussing English treatment of Bermuda Form dis-
putes). 
 195. See Randall, supra note 9, at 262-63; Larry P. Schiffer, How Court Decisions Can Help Improve 
Arbitration Clauses in Reinsurance Contracts, 40 BRIEF 54, 54-61 (2011) (addressing a number of 
issues that are also relevant to Bermuda Form arbitration). 
 196. See Jeffery B. Struckhofff, The Irony of Uberrimae Fidei: Bad Faith Practices in Marine Insur-
ance, 29 TUL. MAR. L.J. 287, 311-12 (2005). That, of course, was the precise intent of the drafters of 
the Bermuda Form, who viewed U.S. judges and juries as largely suspect in disputes involving tort 
insurance. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 14. Furthermore, commentators who argue that “U.S. 
courts should refuse to enforce choice of law, forum selection, and London arbitration clauses when 
they are used to contravene public policy or deprive an insured of a remedy” fail to take into account 
decades of U.S. Supreme Court precedent providing for party autonomy in the area of international 
dispute resolution. Struckhofff, supra, at 311-12; see also infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 197. These criticisms are also highly reminiscent of the types of objections that were set aside long 
ago in other forms of international arbitration. See BORN, supra note 10, at 35, 38, 41-42. 
 198. McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *11. 
 199. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at vii (noting practitioners and arbitrators are drawn from a 
small cadre of insiders); Merkin, supra note 152, at 162; see also Masters, supra note 17, at *14 (not-
ing that parties to a Bermuda Form dispute have traditionally settled their cases, which suggests a 
standard understanding of the relative merits of particular issues). 
 200. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 21-23; Fellas, supra note 155, at 134; see also supra 
notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
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trators are doing a better job at promoting predictability than judges and juries 
once did.201 
Concerns about public policy also fall short, since such comments fail to ap-
preciate the extent to which U.S. courts are capable of addressing matters that are 
truly relevant to U.S. public policy.  According to the “second look doctrine” 
enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrys-
ler-Plymouth, Inc., courts are entitled to take a “second look” at certain public law 
claims at the end of the proceedings, when the award is being enforced.202  This 
principle is based on Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, which indi-
cates that judges can consider matters of public policy in any action to enforce or 
recognize a foreign arbitral award.203  Although Mitsubishi arose in the context of 
antitrust claims, some people view insurance and reinsurance law as reflecting a 
number of important public law issues, even in the international realm, and U.S. 
courts could very well decide that the second look doctrine applies to Bermuda 
Form and other types of international insurance arbitrations to the same extent it 
does to international arbitration of antitrust disputes.204 
Although courts are expressly allowed to consider public policy when consid-
ering the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, specialists in insurance law 
would do well to recognize that such arguments seldom prevail in the international 
realm due to the extremely narrow interpretation of “public policy” in internation-
al commercial arbitration.205  For example, courts agree that 
[e]ven though the Convention refers clearly to the public policy of the 
enforcing state, it has been a consistent theme of recognition decisions 
under Article V(2)(b) to interpret national public policies in a manner 
that is consistent, insofar as possible, with the objectives of the Conven-
tion and the public policies and interests of other Contracting States.  
This approach has manifested itself in two principal ways: (a) the appli-
cation of “international” public policies, rather than domestic public poli-
cies, under Article V(2)(b), and (b) the exercise of a substantial degree of 
                                                          
 201. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at vii-viii. 
 202. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) (“Hav-
ing permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United States will have the oppor-
tunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the 
antitrust laws has been addressed . . . . While the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substan-
tive review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive inquiry to 
ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.”); see also 
BORN, supra note 10, at 3689. 
 203. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. V(2)(b) (“Recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and 
enforcement is sought finds that: . . . (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contra-
ry to the public policy of that country.”). Matters arising under Article V(2) of the New York Conven-
tion can be raised on the application of a party or sua sponte. See id.; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, 
at 73 (noting that outcome arises because of the absence of language relating to proof being submitted 
by a party and because of the public nature of the issues at stake). 
 204. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 638. One interesting counterargument might be based on the 
allegation that the McCarran-Ferguson Act constitutes a legislative grant of antitrust immunity. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012); Susan Beth Farmer, Competition and Regulation in the Insurance Sector: 
Reassessing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 89 OR. L. REV. 915, 948 (2011). 
 205. See BORN, supra note 10, at 3689 (noting courts operating under the second look doctrine are 
highly deferential to arbitral tribunals); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 84. 
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restraint and moderation in the application of public policies under Arti-
cle V(2)(b).206 
Thus, U.S. courts have limited application of Article V(2)(b) to “only those 
circumstances where enforcement would violate our most basic notions of morali-
ty and justice.”207  Furthermore, Article V(2)(b) does not permit non-enforcement 
based on “erroneous legal reasoning or misapplication of law,” two theories that 
are reminiscent of the highly controversial principle of “manifest disregard of 
law,” which, if allowed, would effectively permit substantive review of the 
award.208 
At this point, there has been no major U.S. decision relating to the enforce-
ment of an arbitral award involving the Bermuda Form.209  However, it is possible 
to contemplate certain public policy arguments arising in the future.  For example, 
a party might object to enforcement of a Bermuda Form award based on language 
indicating that arbitrators are prohibited from considering principles that 
pertain to regulation under the New York Insurance Law, or regulations 
issued by the Insurance Department of the State of New York pursuant 
thereto, applying to insurers doing insurance business, or issuance, deliv-
ery or procurement of policies of insurance, within the State of New 
York or as respects risks or insureds situated in the State of New York.210 
Although this sort of challenge is in many ways predictable, it will face a 
number of difficulties.  First, the public policy of New York cannot necessarily be 
considered the public policy of the United States, particularly given the state-
centric nature of the policies in question (which explicitly refer only to matters 
internal to New York).211  Furthermore, New York public policy likely cannot be 
considered to rise to the level of an international public policy. 
Second, although some Bermuda Form arbitrations may appear to be exclu-
sively between U.S. parties, many of those matters will nevertheless have signifi-
cant foreign connections.212  This type of international nexus can be problematic 
                                                          
 206. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 
F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 84. 
 207. Telenor Mobile Commc’ns AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 411 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omit-
ted). 
 208. Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 306; see also supra note 181 and accompanying text (regarding 
C v. D and arguments based on manifest disregard of law). 
 209. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 15. This phenomenon may largely be the result of the fact 
that, until recently, most Bermuda Form arbitrations settled. See Masters, supra note 17, at *14. 
 210. Fellas, supra note 155, at 134-35 (quoting article VI.O of Bermuda Form XL XS-004); see C v. 
D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 [2] (Eng.) (quoting portions of the conditions section of a Bermuda Form 
policy dealing with governing law). The exclusion of punitive damages in international commercial 
arbitration is not problematic as a matter of public policy. See BORN, supra note 10, at 355; see also 
supra note 162 and accompanying text (noting punitive damages are excluded from Bermuda Form 
arbitration). 
 211. See supra notes 55, 143 and accompanying text. 
 212. See C, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 at [2] (noting that although the named parties were from the 
United States, “[t]he claimant was the named insured but the definition of the insured included any 
subsidiary, affiliate or associated company of the claimant as listed in the Schedule to the Policy. That 
list included 303 companies incorporated outside the United States of America so the policy offered 
world-wide cover.”). 
29
Strong: The Special Nature of International Insurance and Reinsurance Arb
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
312 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2015 
from a public policy perspective, since U.S. courts are extremely hesitant to give 
extraterritorial effect to U.S. laws.213 
Third, some criticism of Bermuda Form arbitration appears to focus on the 
need to protect the proper development of New York law.214  However, there is no 
need to correlate the modified form of New York law used in Bermuda Form arbi-
tration with the law applied in New York state courts, since arbitral awards have 
no formal precedential power and thus cannot be used to inform the development 
of case law in New York or the United States more generally.215  Furthermore, 
neither U.S. nor New York courts can be in any way “offended” by the way in 
which arbitrators or foreign courts interpret the Bermuda Form’s modified form of 
New York law, just as various international bodies such as the International Insti-
tute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) cannot be offended if an 
arbitrator or court misapplies general principles of international law such as the 
UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts.216 
Many of these concerns appear to arise as a result of a misunderstanding 
about the way in which party autonomy and public policy interact in international 
arbitration.217  As the following section shows, numerous courts, including those 
in the United States, have protected procedural and substantive freedom in arbitra-
tion even in matters that can be seen as affecting public values. 
                                                          
 213. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 33, at 915, 917 n.94. 
 214. See Randall, supra note 9, at 262-63; Schiffer, supra note 195, at 54-61. 
 215. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Critics who enunciate concerns about the way in 
which arbitration precludes the “proper development” of the law tend to ignore the fact that arbitral 
decisions do not affect judicial standards of interpretation. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
However, arbitrators can and often do take other arbitral awards into account in their determinations, 
which suggests the potential for development of various principles within the arbitral realm, thereby 
ensuring consistency and predictability as a matter of substance and procedure. See supra notes 66, 
199 and accompanying text. Internal consistency is particularly likely to arise in fields where practi-
tioners and arbitrators share a common legal background, as is the case with international insurance 
and reinsurance law. See supra notes 199 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Principles of Commercial Contracts, UNIDROIT, 
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles-2010; see also Charles 
N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Creeping Codification of Transnational Commercial Law: An 
Arbitrator’s Perspective, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 199, 205 (2004) (discussing choice of law in arbitration). 
 217. The Bermuda Form arbitration has also been subject to several other types of criticism, although 
those concerns are equally misplaced. For example, some people criticize Bermuda Form arbitration 
for not being significantly less expensive than litigation. See Masters, supra note 17, at *4, *15. How-
ever, this criticism not only misses the major rationales supporting arbitration in the international 
arena, it also fails to appreciate how international disputes differ from domestic disputes. See supra 
notes 41-42 and accompanying text. Commentators adopting this perspective also object to the possi-
bility of “a series of arbitrations . . . to go up the ‘chain’ of insurance companies, with the attendant 
risk of inconsistent results and increased costs.” Masters, supra note 17, at *15. However, this type of 
“batching” (also known as “occurrence integration”) is expressly required in Bermuda Form arbitra-
tion. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 18-19; Masters, supra note 17, at *17. Such problems can 
also be avoided by consolidating proceedings or engaging in various types of large-scale arbitration. 
See S.I. STRONG, MASS, CLASS, AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 18, 22, 123-24, 240, 349 (2012) (discussing large-scale arbitration in the insurance context); 
Mitchell S. King & John E. Matosky, Considering Consolidation, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 70, 71 (2011) 
(discussing consolidation of insurance and reinsurance arbitration under U.S. law). 
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V. INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE ARBITRATION – 
TENSIONS BETWEEN PARTY AUTONOMY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Although international insurance and reinsurance are not subject to the same 
level of formal regulation as domestic insurance, critics of international insurance 
and reinsurance arbitration nevertheless invoke various types of public policy 
concerns as grounds for challenging the use of arbitration in international insur-
ance disputes.218  For example, commentators have suggested that arbitration is 
used as a means for unscrupulous parties to evade their legal obligations.219  These 
types of concerns are not unique to the insurance industry and have often been 
raised (and overcome) in other types of international arbitration.220 
Although public policy issues can be raised in international arbitration, the 
calculus is somewhat different than in the domestic context, as discussed previ-
ously.221  Furthermore, the fact that Congress has allowed states to limit arbitra-
tion of domestic insurance disputes under the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not 
necessarily mean that the same result will or should occur in international dis-
putes, since the U.S. Supreme Court and numerous lower courts have all “articu-
late[d] a uniform policy in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate internation-
ally, even when ‘a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic con-
text.’”222 
Some experts maintain that this pro-arbitration policy is based on the fact that 
international commercial arbitration provides “a neutral, speedy and expert dis-
pute resolution process, largely subject to the parties’ control, in a single, central-
ized forum, with internationally-enforceable dispute resolution agreements and 
decisions.”223  However, that rationale focuses on why parties and practitioners 
might want to engage in international arbitration and does not explain why courts 
and legislatures are willing to allow parties to exercise an extremely high degree 
of substantive and procedural autonomy in cross-border business disputes in mat-
ters that may affect the public interest.224 
The most popular explanation for why states support of international com-
mercial arbitration is economic in nature.225  Conventional wisdom suggests that 
allowing parties to an international transaction to choose the substantive and pro-
                                                          
 218. See McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *3; see also Masters, supra note 17, at *3 (discussing regula-
tory regime). 
 219. See Randall, supra note 9, at 257-64; Struckhofff, supra note 196, at 311-12 
 220. See Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Mandatory Rules and International Arbitration, 23 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 49, 50-51, 73 (2012) (discussing concerns in international commercial arbitration more 
generally). 
 221. See supra notes 143, 205 and accompanying text. 
 222. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (emphasis 
added); see also 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390 
(4th Cir. 2012); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 37. 
 223. BORN, supra note 10, at 73. 
 224. Some analysis has been conducted in this regard. See S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. 
§1782: Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 
1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 347-50 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Discovery] (discussion public 
grants of jurisdiction); id. at 360-67 (discussing state interest in international commercial arbitration). 
 225. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009). Closer examination might reveal some additional justifica-
tions, although that analysis is beyond the scope of the current discussion. See Strong, Discovery, 
supra note 224, at 347-50, 360-67. 
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cedural law applicable to their dispute promotes international trade and commerce 
in a way that would not be possible if national courts retained exclusive jurisdic-
tion over such matters.226  Although this hypothesis has not been empirically 
proven, it has also not been effectively challenged,227 and the numerous benefits 
associated with robust international trade has led the vast majority of developed 
and developing countries to grant parties a significant amount of autonomy relat-
ing to the resolution of cross-border commercial disputes, even at the cost of cer-
tain domestic interests, so as to maximize national economic growth.228 
These sorts of commercial rationales may be particularly persuasive in inter-
national insurance and reinsurance arbitration.  Not only does the international 
insurance industry constitute a significant and expanding part of the U.S. and 
global economy, but international markets are far better at allocating and absorb-
ing the risk of catastrophic risk than domestic markets would be.229  Furthermore, 
the economic benefits associated with international insurance arbitration extend 
not only to governments but also to individual policyholders, since the process of 
spreading the risk internationally helps protect the viability of the insurer and 
increases the likelihood of a full pay-out to an individual policyholder in cases of 
catastrophic loss.230 
Allowing a high degree of procedural and substantive autonomy in interna-
tional insurance and reinsurance arbitration also makes sense given that the vast 
majority of participants are sophisticated commercial entities negotiating at arm’s 
length.231  Furthermore, the sums at issue in international insurance disputes tend 
                                                          
 226. See BORN, supra note 10, at 77; see also Strong, Discovery, supra note 224, at 347-50, 360-67 
(discussing jurisdictional issues in international arbitration). 
 227. No known study has ever considered whether the autonomy granted in international commercial 
arbitration results in a net gain or a net cost to countries participating in the international arbitral re-
gime. See S.I. Strong, International Litigation – Arbitration, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Jürgen George Backhaus ed., 2014) (outlining major law and economics analyses con-
cerning international commercial arbitration). However, there are a number of law and economics 
analyses relating to the choice of arbitration in the domestic realm. See id.; see also Christopher R. 
Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs From Arbitration Clauses, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1948 n.15 (2014) (discussing procedural choice from a law and economics perspec-
tive).  Furthermore, the large number of signatories to the New York Convention (currently 156) and 
the depth of national legislation on international commercial arbitration demonstrates the extent to 
which countries support international arbitration as a means of promoting trade. See New York Con-
vention, supra note 43; New York Convention Status, supra note 45; Carbonneau, supra note 225, at 
1345-46. 
 228. See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶¶ 
2-20, 26-19 to 26-22 (2003); BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 10, at ¶¶ 1.220 to 1.224; Loukas Mistelis, 
Reality Test: Current State of Affairs in Theory and Practice Relating to “Lex Arbitri,” 17 AM. REV. 
INT’L L. 155, 178 (2006) (suggesting commercial interests overcome state interests in “subjecting 
arbitration proceedings to national law”). 
 229. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 144, at 3 (suggesting that 62% of U.S. 
insurance premiums were ceded to offshore companies, although that number rises to 92% if the fact 
that many U.S. reinsurers are owned by foreign companies is taken into account). 
 230. See Randall, supra note 9, at 259-60. 
 231. See supra notes 29, 39 and accompanying text. While some questions have been raised about the 
propriety of allowing international insurance and reinsurance claims to be heard in a process that is 
controlled by the parties, particularly those who operate as “repeat players,” parties who believe them-
selves relatively inexperienced in either a negotiation or dispute resolution process can always consult 
with expert advisors, including counsel. See Masters, supra note 17, at *16 (claiming Bermuda Form 
arbitration injures policyholders); see also Struckhofff, supra note 196, at 311-12 (discussing alleged 
problems of arbitration). 
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to be significant, running into the millions or billions of dollars.232  As a result, 
international insurance arbitration can be easily distinguished from domestic 
forms of insurance arbitration, where protectionist policies aimed at protecting 
particularly vulnerable parties in relatively small disputes often justify the limita-
tion of party autonomy.233 
Given these features, it is not surprising that courts and legislatures around 
the world have supported party autonomy in international insurance and reinsur-
ance arbitration.  As a result, parties are generally free to decide a variety of mat-
ters for themselves, including “the disputes to be arbitrated, the parties to the arbi-
tration, the mode of constituting the arbitral tribunal, the selection of the arbitral 
seat, the language of the arbitration, the arbitral procedures and the choice of the 
applicable law(s).”234 
This is not to say that party autonomy will prevail over the public interest in 
all regards.  To the contrary, established principles of international arbitration 
identify when and how party autonomy may be limited to protect the parties, the 
process or the public interest.  These mechanisms typically come into play at the 
end of the procedure, when parties attempt to enforce an arbitral award.235  Thus, 
the second look doctrine protects against attempts to evade the various public 
policies embedded in various substantive laws236 while other aspects of the New 
York Convention preclude efforts to circumvent basic principles of procedural 
fairness.237  These devices have proven extremely effective and have led to arbi-
tration’s becoming the preferred means of resolving disputes in a wide variety of 
cross-border business matters.238 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Experts agree that “[t]he topic of international insurance is more important 
than ever due to the increasing internationalization of business, the cross-border 
nature of employment, and drastic changes in the types of risks companies face 
and the types of insurance that mitigate those risks.”239  However, insurance law 
                                                          
 232. The underlying figures can be astronomical.  For example, international “[s]porting events like 
the 2014 World Cup in Brazil generate around $2 billion in cancellation insurance.”  Carolyn Cohn, 
World Cup Insurers Face Many Claims, Disputes Over Russia, Qatar, INS. J. (June 19, 2015), availa-
ble at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2015/06/19/372424.htm.  Similarly, large 
amounts can arise in other types of insurance disputes.  See Acosta v. Master Maint. & Constr. Inc., 
452 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2006) (involving a claim involving over 2,000 victims of a mustard gas release 
and determining that the action fell within the scope of the New York Convention). 
 233. See Randall, supra note 9, at 259-60 (discussing small individual claims in the domestic con-
text). 
 234. BORN, supra note 10, at 1257 (footnotes omitted). These and other issues are typically decided at 
the time the arbitration agreement is drafted. See Labes, supra note 14, at 896-902 (containing various 
suggestions on drafting arbitration agreements relating to insurance disputes). 
 235. This approach is considered an appropriate balance between the need for a speedy resolution of 
the dispute and the need to avoid procedural improprieties. See BORN, supra note 10, at 3645, 3689. 
 236. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985); see 
also supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. 
 237. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. V; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 71-85. 
 238. See BORN, supra note 10, at 91-92. 
 239. Mark R. Goodman, Navigating Ambiguity: Approaches to Dealing with US Regulation of Inter-
national Insurance, in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON 
DEVELOPING PURCHASE STRATEGIES AND OVERCOMING REGULATORY CHALLENGES (2015), availa-
ble at 2015 WL 831984, *1, *4. 
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does not exist in a vacuum.  As Professor Jerry noted, there are an increasing 
number of convergences between the substantive law of insurance and the proce-
dural law of arbitration.240  These convergences give rise to a number of actual 
and potential concerns that must be addressed by commentators so as to improve 
the resolution of insurance disputes on an individual and systemic level. 
Although more research is necessary in all types of insurance dispute resolu-
tion, this Response has attempted to demonstrate the particular complexity of 
international insurance and reinsurance arbitration.  As this discussion has shown, 
the current regime gives rise to a wide variety of tensions, including those be-
tween national and international law, foreign and domestic law, and public and 
private interests.  While these tensions can be reconciled in a principled manner, 
that process requires a sophisticated knowledge of insurance law, international 
law and arbitration law.  As a result, experts in insurance and international arbitra-
tion must work together to ensure that dispute resolution processes in this field 
operate in a fair and efficient manner.  The hope is that specialists in both fields 
will heed Professor Jerry’s call to action so as to identify new ideas and new in-
sights into this important area of law. 
                                                          
 240. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 260. 
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